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Abstract 
This paper considers the "essential facilities doctrine" and the 
role it should have in New Zealand's law today. In order to 
determine the best way for any such doctrine to be imported into 
New Zealand law, the work of the Hilmer Committee which lead to 
the recent enactment of the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 
(Australia) is considered. The Australian regime lies outside of the 
bounds of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 and as such is a 
novel method for the imposition of a competition law doctrine. This 
paper concludes that there is merit in New Zealand adopting a 
regime similar to that enacted in Australia. However, after a careful 
analysis of the Australian regime, the conclusion is reached that 
some modifications would be required before New Zealand could 
truly maximize the benefits to be obtained from such an enactment. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The "essential facilities" doctrine is not a per se doctrinel or 
an independent tool of analysis, rather, it is a useful label to 
describe a particular area of antitrust.2 The doctrine may be 
basically encapsulated by the following words found in Hecht 3 
"where facilities cannot practicably be duplicated by would-be 
competitors those in possession of them must allow them to be 
shared on fair terms." The basic concern of the doctrine has been 
simply stated by Robertson as the situation where a monopolist 
possesses a resource or "facility" that may be denied to certain 
persons for whom it is "essential." 
While Areeda has noted that granting access to others has a 
certain intuitive appeal, this paper attempts to analyse the value of 
such a principal at a deeper level. The doctrine will be examined rn 
detail and areas of contention concerning its elements will be 
considered. Particular attention will be given to the potential 
remedies that the courts are able to grant in light of the doctrine's 
breach and administrative concerns relating to the doctrine's 
enforcement. 
This paper will outline New Zealand's current approach to the 
essential facilities doctrine. The paper will note propositions 
established in relation to essential facilities by New Zealand case-
law. The potential role of section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 and 
the Commerce Commission's Business Acquisition Guidelines in 
enforcing the doctrine in New Zealand will also be examined. 
The paper's principal focus however is on the recent 
enactment of the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Australia)
4 
which establishes an essential facilities access regime independent 
of competition law regulation in Australia. This Act is novel in that 
it specifically provides for an access regime rather than allowing 
general competition law principles or competition law legislation to 
enforce the doctrine. 
Having considered the issues involved with the doctrine and 
the Act, the paper will attempt to draw conclusions as to whether 
New Zealand should adopt the essential facilities doctrine and if so 
whether an independent access regime would have merit for us in 
this country. 
l Areeda & Turner Antitrust Law ( Little Brown, Boston, 1978; 1995 Update) 736.2f 
2 Hinton P "Competition Policy after the Porter Report" NZLJ 1992,71. 
3 Hecht v Pro Football League 570 F 2d 982 (1977). 
4 Hereinafter CPRA 
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II THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE - OVERVIEW 
A The Jurisprudential Basis For The Doctrine 
As has been noted, the idea that a near monopoly holder 
should have to give access to another has a certain intuitive appeal. 
However a deeper analysis is required before such a doctrine can 
be justified5. 
The Chicago School of Economic analysis6 would argue that 
efficiency considerations militate against requiring an essential 
facilities holder being required to give access to a competitor. That 
school regards the firm as being in the best position to judge 
whether it is cost-effective to provide a competitor with rights to 
an essential facility .7 
In Aspen8 the American Supreme Court asked whether an 
essential facilities holder's behaviour could fairly be categorized as 
predatory if it was excluding its rival from using the facility. The 
rationale being that an essential facilities holder is likely to be 
excluding access based on efficiency concerns and thus may not in 
fact be engaging in predatory behaviour. Writers such as Robertson 
have taken the view that there is no justification for any type of an 
essential facilities doctrine, adopting the view that "there is some 
price at which almost any firm will share access to a scarce 
resource within its possession" and therefore that "it is reasonable 
to infer that all essential facilities plaintiffs are merely 
disappointed suitors, asking the court to grant access cheaply when 
the market would not. "9 Indeed Tye has stated that "[i]f the two 
firms are not competitors in an upstream or downstream market 
what besides efficiency considerations would motivate the denial of 
access?" 10. Further the Chicago School holds that the essential 
facilities doctrine should not be regarded as invoking a general 
duty to deal. Such a limitless doctrine would "discourage joint 
investment in a facility that no single investor could afford." l 1 
However as against the view that the essential facilities 
doctrine is unmeritorious lies the opinion that market competition 
5 Above note l. 
6 A large body of thinkers come within this group, Areeda & Hovenkamp Antitrust Law 
(Little Brown,Boston, 1996); Posner An Economic Analysis of Law (Little Brown, 
Boston, 1982). 
7 Areeda & Turner, above note 1. 
8 Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp 472 US 585 (1985). 
9 DB Robertson "Government Business Enterprises and Access to Essential Facilities" 2 (Nov 
1994) Comp & Consumer Law Jnl 948. 
10 Tye "Toward Achieving Workable Competition in Industries" (summer 88) Yale Jnl on 
Regn 
l 1 Troy "Unclogging the Bottleneck : A New Essential Facility Doctrine" 83 Colum L J 462. 
2. 
would be significantly improved if the doctrine is invoked. Douglas 
Williamson has taken the view that it is because competition law 
regulators such as the Australian Consumer and Competition 
Commission 12 have not cured all the structural defects in the 
market that the essential facilities doctrine is required to remedy 
the inefficiencies left in the market. 
The essential facilities doctrine is primarily concerned with 
harm to a competitor while Vautier has stated that "such harm 
need not coincide with harm to competition"l 3 Areeda and Turner 
note that "a particular plaintiff's plight is relevant only as it bears 
on market effects."14 Areeda's position seems to be supported 
throughout the American case-law as was held in MC/15 the 
purpose of the doctrine is to promote competition. It is submitted, 
however, that even if the goal of the doctrine is viewed as being 
preventing harm to competition in markets generally, the 
consideration of the impact on an individual competitor will weigh 
heavily in a courts assessment. 16 The jurisprudential basis for the 
essential facilities doctrine in its home, America, seems to have 
been well analysed by Troy "a tightrope is being walked between 
the free trade values (in light of the defence to the invocation of the 
doctrine that there is a legitimate business reason for the denial of 
access to the facility) and the purpose of antitrust laws - to promote 
and protect competition." 1 7 
B The Essential Requirements of the Doctrine 
Firstly the limits of the doctrine (as it has been enunciated rn 
America) should be considered. The doctrine was dismissed as 
existing in Australia in the case of Queensland Wire. 18 Although on 
closer analysis this case may not meet the criteria of being a true 
essential facilities case, and the comments made by the Full Federal 
Court can technically be regarded as obiter, the case is nonetheless 
indicative of the likely approach to the essential facilities doctrine 
in Australia. The Australian court treated the doctrine as being a 
mere gloss on the American Sherman Act 1890 (USA) which was 
12 Hereinafter the ACCC. 
13 KM Vautier "The Essential Facilities Doctrine" Occasional Paper No 4 ( Commerce 
Commission, Wellington, March 1990)1,7. 
14 Above note 1,639. 
15 MCI Communication v American Telephone and Telegraph Co 708 F 2d 1081 Seventh 
Circuit [1983) 
16 Shirtcliffe "Access to Essential facilities in Electricity Supply" cited in Commerce 
Commission 5 Current Issues in New Zealand Competition and Consumer Law (May 
1993),35; Vautier above note 32,7; Troy above note 11,453. 
17 Troy above note 11,462. 
18 Queensland Wire v BHP Industries Ltd (1988) ATPR 40-84. 
regarded as a specific statute. Thus the doctrine was regarded as 
inapplicable to any action instigated by a plaintiff under section 46 
of the Australian Trade Practices Act 197 4. As the doctrine 
originates from sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 1890 it is the 
American analysis of the elements of the doctrine which will be 
considered as outlining the doctrine's prima facie scope. 
It is important that the essential facilities doctrine only found 
an action against an essential facilities holder when various 
requirements are met. This is in light of the fact that prima facie a 
monopolist is free to compete as is any firm, thus, it is only to be in 
certain clearly defined restrictive circumstances that its power to 
deal should be limited. As was noted in the American case 
Olympia 19 a monopolist is to be encouraged to compete aggressively 
on the merits . If this does not occur the antitrust laws would 
effectively be holding an umbrella over inefficient competitors. In 
light of this Areeda has noted as the first principle in his essential 
facility analysis that liability for denying access should be 
exceptional. 20 
Thus the courts have (particularly in America from where the 
doctrine originated) imposed restrictive conditions before a plaintiff 
can successfully assert the essential facilities doctrine. This reqmres 
that the plaintiff prove : 
* the facility meets the concept of "essential"; 
* a grant of access made to him will improve competition 
m the market place; 
* the plaintiff is indeed a competitor of the defendant; 
* if the defendant raises a legitimate business reason for 
denying access, that this is not so. 
* the defendant intended to exclude its rivals by denying 
access to them; 
* any remedy the court gives will be administrable. (The 
court needs to be satisfied that any order they make can be 
enforced without the court becoming a price control agency). 
Each of these requirements will now be examined. However, 
firstly, it should be noted that as regards already regulated 
industries the court should take into account such factors as 
whether the challenged conduct is the result of unilateral/concerted 
activity; the level of regulation within the challenged industry and 
the feasibility of applying the remedy of compulsory dealing to the 
situation.2 1 This allows for the fact that in industries where the 
government has already imposed market regulation there is little 
need to invoke competition law as a means of ensuring that 
I 9 Olympia Equipment Leasing Western Union Tel Co 797 F 2d S70; 480 US 9S4 (1987) 
20 Above note 1. 
21 Edgar F "The Essential Facilities Doctrine" 29 Idaho Law Rev (1992) 283,303. 
adequate compet1t10n occurs, as, presumably, the government has 
already determined what level of competition is desirable and has 
factored this into its analysis of what level of regulation is 
necessary for the industry. 
It should also be noted, before the above requirements are 
analyzed further, that they provide a broad framework only and 
that none have ben defined in concrete terms. The exact extent and 
scope of each of the factors has been the subject of case-law and 
argument. This has caused Troy to assert that "(t)here are no clear 
rules govern(ing) when the essential facility doctrine should be 
invoked. Nor is there a consensus as to what the doctrine requires 
once invoked. "22 While there is some truth in this claim, the 
requirements above do encode at least the essential limits of the 
doctrine, albeit in a somewhat open way. 
1 Essentiality 
The courts have imposed the "essentiality" requirement as 
the initial hurdle which must be surmounted before the doctrine 
can found a remedy. Areeda notes that an essential facility is 
typically a resource possessed by the defendant over which he has 
a clear cost advantage. 
The case which spawned the essential facilities doctrine was 
Terminal Railroad23 . There the American Supreme Court had little 
difficulty in viewing a railroad company's monopoly position over 
terms of access to a bridge as involving something essential relative 
to other operators. This case lead to many others which fleshed out 
the essentiality requirement. The case of MCI 24 established that 
before the essential facilities doctrine could be invoked control of 
the essential facility must be held by a monopolist and the 
competitor must be incapable of duplicating the facility. The cases 
culminated in Alaska Airline /nc2 5which established that a facility 
could be regarded as essential only when the facility owner had the 
power to eliminate competition by the denial of access to it and this 
power was relatively permanent. Corsearch 26 further specified that 
before a facility can be regarded as "essential" its "duplication must 
be economically infeasible" denial of access must cause at least a 
"severe handicap" to the competitor. 
Thus the "essentiality" criterion is likely to place a significant 
block on the indiscriminate use of the doctrine by rivals to gain 
access to essential facilities. 
22 Above note 11, 441. 
23 Terminal Railroad Assn of Saint Louis 224 US 383; 32 S Ct 597; 56L Ed 810 (1912). 
24 Above note 15. 
25 Alaska Airlines Inc vUnited Airlines Inc (1991] 2 Trade Cases 69,624. 
26 Corsearch v Thomson and Thomson (1992] Trade Cases 69,819. 
In Queensland Wire the Australian Federal Court stated that 
there was difficulty "in seeing the limit of the concept of "essential 
facility" noting that the doctrine had enabled access to be granted 
to a sports stadium in Fishman. 27 However, it is submitted that an 
American sports stadium could amount to an essential facility . This 
is not in itself unreasonable and does not mean that the 
"essentiality" test is too wide. 
It is important to note concerning the idea of "essentiality" 
that the competitor whose conduct is in question must be a 
monopolist not only of the "essential" facility itself, but also of the 
market to which the "essential" facility actually impacts on. Without 
an impact on this secondary market no ultimate anti-competitive 
effect can result from the denial of access. Thus competition law 
would have no jurisprudential grounds for interfering in the 
conduct as competition would not ultimately be harmed. In the 
essential facilities context it should be remembered that the court 
will place substantial weight on the impact felt by a particular 
competitor. This too is likely to be less where the monopolist does 
not hold a monopoly over the essential facility. 
2 Granting access may improve competition 
For an essential facilities doctrine to accord with competition 
law policy in general (policies reflected in the Sherman Act 1890, 
the Australian Trade Practices Act 1976 and the New Zealand 
Commerce Act 1986) its application must result in the enhancement 
of a competitive market. Thus, the court must be satisfied that a 
grant of access would prevent a reduction of competitiveness in a 
market. The doctrine seeks to ameliorate the mischief caused when 
a monopolist is extending its monopoly power from a monopoly 
power in a secondary market. The cases of MC I 28 City of 
Anaheim29 and Continental Trend Resources Inc30 firmly establish 
that the plaintiff must prove to the court's satisfaction that 
competition policy will be enhanced by a grant of access. However 
it should be noted that in proving this the court is likely to take 
much guidance from the harm felt by the individual competitor 
which cntrasts with the policy approach taken to many competition 
law principles. 
3 The plaintiff must be a competitor of the defendant 
Relief under the traditional essential facilities doctrine is only 
available to a competitor of the monopolist. This accords with the 
27 Fishman v Wirtz *807 F 2d 520 (1986) 
28 Above note 15. 
29 City of Anaheim v Southern Californian Edison Co [1992] 1 Trade Cases 69,716 
30continental Trend Resources Inc [1991] 2 Trade Cases 69,510 
purpose of the doctrine and the focus on the impact to individual 
competitors in light of a denial of access. This was the traditional 
American exposition in the case of Grand Catillou 31. In that case 
even arbitrary refusals by a monopolist to deal were alleged to 
have breached the essential facilities doctrine. The court responded 
to the contention by holding that they did not have the jurisdiction 
to prevent the defendant's conduct, given the arbitrary nature of 
the refusal to deal. Official Airlines32 further affirmed this 
propos1t10n. MCI further affirms this proposition in an explicit 
statement that "the denial of access to an essential facility must be 
a denial to a competitor of a monopolist."3 3 
There can perhaps be questions raised as to the merit of the 
requirement that the plaintiff be a competitor. It can be submitted 
that the injury a consumer suffers could be equated to that of a 
competitor, thus the consumer should also have an action available 
to him. However the difference may be that granting access to a 
consumer will not increase competition in a market if this is 
measured in terms of the number of market entrants able to 
compete or pure market efficiency. However, if competition law 1s 
to be regarded as being responsible for providing a variety of 
products to consumers at a reasonable price perhaps essential 
facility claims should be open to consumers. If this is so, the use of 
the essential facilities doctrine as one which stems from 
competition law should be able to accomodate such claims. 
However, the traditional position is that the essential facilities 
doctrine can not be asserted by other than competitiors. As the 
Australian Federal Court noted in purportedly rejecting the 
existence of the essential facilities doctrine in Australia, "where the 
aid of the court is sought to oblige the respondent to accept the 
applicant as a customer"34 to an essential facility no remedy can be 
provided by the doctrine. 
It should perhaps be noted that in the Australian context 
most essential facilities actions are likely to be based on section 46 
of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974. If a claim is made on 
this basis the use of the words "any market" in the section would 
make it difficult for those who are not competitors to bring an 
essential facilities action. This is clearly specified by the ACCC in its 
Guidelines concerning the use of section 46 of the Australian Trade 
Practices Act 1974. This statutory limitation would accord with the 
traditional common law restriction on the use of the doctrine. 
3 I Grand Catillou 65 FTC 799; also cited as la Peye v FTC 366 F 2d 117 
32 Official Airlines Guides v FTC 630 F 2d 920; 450 US 917 (1981). 
33 Above note 15. 
34 Above note 18, 40-841. 
l 
4 No legitimate business reason exists to justify any denial of 
access 
It is a well founded principle of the essential facilities 
doctrine that there is no general duty to deal. Thus the liability of 
the monopolist must be exceptional. Such a principle ties into the 
idea that where a monopolist has a legitimate reason for the denial 
of access to a competitor, no liability should be imposed. This 
requirement links to the purpose of the doctrine that the mischief 
which is to be attacked is the maintenance or enhancement of 
monopoly power by the essential facility holder35. As was noted in 
Olympia36 "the lawful monopolist should be free to compete like 
everyone else; otherwise the antitrust laws would be holding an 
umbrella over inefficient competitors." This approach is also 
partially reflective of the general approach of the courts that it is 
not their place to interfere in business decision-making practices.3 7 
As Areeda notes, no matter how essential a monopolist's facilities 
he is never obliged to sacrifice legitimate business objectives in 
allowing access to his facility to a competitor. This accords with the 
idea that if a reasonable fee is set by a monopolist there can be no 
breach of the essential facilities doctrine in requiring his competitor 
to pay. The proposition was expressly stated in the City of 
Anaheim38 case that if the facility holder's service or product will 
be diminished by the imposition of an access order, such an order 
can not be made. This further ties to the historic "free-trader" 
concept that a major purpose of free market activity is unhindered 
free choice.3 9 
The importance of recogmsmg an access holder's right to 
undertake legitimate business conduct despite the retention of the 
essential facility to the acceptance of the essential facilities doctrine 
can be seen by studying Queensland Wire . 40 There the Australian 
Federal Court adopted the view that an essential facilities doctrine 
liberally applied could potentially prevent a facility holder from 
operating legitimately. Thus the doctrine's application in Australia 
was rejected. However it is respectfully submitted that the 
Australian Federal Court in considering the doctrine's potential 
application failed to understand its true limits. The doctrines need 
not be incompatible with allowing legitimate commercial activity, 
35 City of Anaheim v Southern California Edison Co above note 28. 
36 Above note 18. 
37 Such attitudes are also reflected in laws such as the business judgement rule by which in 
America the courts regard themselves as being without jurisdiction to question the 
business wisdom of director's decisions. 
38 City of Anaheim v Southern California Edison Co above note 28. 
39 Troy above note 11. 
4o Above note 18. 
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rather, it must be used to prevent monopolisation and ensure that 
any business activity is indeed legitimate. 
5 The facility holder's intention to monopolize 
The traditional espousal of the essential facilities doctrine 
requires that the facility holder intend to exclude his rivals in the 
denial of access to the facility. The intention must be to exclude the 
plaintiff by improper means this being a question of objective 
rather than subjective intent. The focus of an intent inquiry is on 
the monopoly power's intention to monopolize, which as the 
American Supreme Court stated in Byars v Bluff City News 
requires a specific intention to do so. There the court held that 
"although a general intent to monopolize is all that is ordinarily 
required to find a section 2 violation ( of the Sherman Act from 
which the doctrine originates), cases discussing a monopolist's duty 
to deal have effectively required a finding of specififc intent to 
monopolize. "41 
Some have argued that a doctrine concerned with the granting 
of access to facilities should not be concerned with intention and 
that the . monopolist's behaviour should be sufficient to allow an 
action. These critics argue that essential facilities analysis should be 
concerned with concepts of ownership rather than purpose.42 As 
Areeda and Turner note a defendant's intention is seldom helpful 
as "denial of access to a competitor is always motivated (at least in 
part), by the desire to exclude him and keep as much of the market 
as he can for himself. "4 3 
6 The remedy is administrable 
One of the primary concerns of those who doubt the value of 
the doctrine is that it will cause uncertainty within the law and will 
involve an abuse of the justice system in that the court will be 
forced to use its time as a price control regulator rather than as a 
settlor of disputes. If the court is to use its time enforcing price 
control and access orders the separation of powers doctrine will be 
breached. Such a regulatory function should be left to 
administrative agencies rather than falling into the hands of the 
court which does not have the capabilities or skills to undertake 
such action. "Judges are in many cases simply not equipped to deal 
with decisions on access prices and conditions. The courts should 
4 l Byars v Bluff City News 273 U S 375,400 ; 683 F 2d 981 6th Cir (1982) affirming Eastman 
Kodak Co v Southern Photos Materials Co. 
42 W Pengilley "Hilmer and Essential Facilities" UNSWL Jnl 1994,1. 
43 Areeda and Turner Antitrust Law (little Brown, Boston, 1978) vol III. 
not under the guise of competition law become business pnce 
regulators. "44 
Setting a reasonable access price raises difficulties as the price 
cannot simply be set at the level the monopolist could charge. As 
has been noted, for the doctrine to be of any benefit some measure 
needs to be taken to ensure that any access price charged is indeed 
below what the monopolist is capable of charging. If the antitrust 
laws allow a monopolist to trade access to his facility at any price 
that the traffic will bear "society will not be much benefitted by 
forcing access in the first place. "45 The monopoly rent will simply 
be perpetuated and no efficiency enhancement will be achieved. 
However the monopoly holder should arguably be somewhat 
reimbursed for the risks he engaged in in the development of the 
essential facility. It is here that the traditional concern of regulating 
prices arises in that by arbitrarily setting a price the court has the 
potential to upset traditional market control mechanisms which will 
stultify capital investment and prevent new entrants from 
competing. 46 Also there lies the traditional policy of the courts that 
where a situation requires continual supervision they will abstain 
from granting injunctions or making orders for specific 
performance. 
However such concerns can not devalue the doctrine in itself. 
Rather, the appropriate approach would be to allow the courts to 
make orders only if another agency can readily enforce them. 
Areeda suggests that a court would in general be capable of 
enforcing orders such as those that a competitor be allowed access 
to a consortium controlling a facility generally; that a a price be 
paid to the facility holder where agencies already exist to supervise 
the exact terms of access and the amount at which this price should 
be set; or, simple orders that the competitor can not be 
discriminated against4 7. In the past the cases arising in America 
tended to stem from a "context of extensive regulatory experience 
and/or previous dealings between the parties. "48 As was noted in 
Byars 49 a history of dealing "greatly facilitates the structuring of a 
decree" as there is guidance for the courts as to what the terms of 
access should be. Consolidated Gas50 was a decision where the 
court ordered that access be granted but refused to make any 
44 Above note 42,3. 
45 Wright R "Injunctive Relief in cases of Refusal to Supply" 19 ABLR (1991) 65. 
46 Above note 42. 
47 Above note 1. In New Zealand an order against discrimination could be made under 
sections 27, 29 or 36 of the Commerce Act 1986. 
48 J G M Shirtcliffe above note 16,44. 
49 Byars v Bluff City News above note 41. 
50 Consolidated Gas Co of Florida v City Gas Co of Florida 665 F Supp 1493 ( S Fla 1987) 
880 F 2d 297 (11th Cir) 1545. 
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determination as to the exact price at which such access should be 
compensated stating instead that Florida had a regulatory agency 
whom could deal with such issue. 
C The Essential Facilities Doctrine and the Prime Necessities 
Doctrines Compared. 
The prime necessities doctrine harks back to a private essay 
of Lord Hale written in the seventeenth century. Lord Hale outlined 
the situation where as a consequence of an Act of Parliament or 
other external factors, a previously private activity took on a public 
function5 l. Such activities once within the public realm had to be 
available for access to the public in return for a reasonable fee. The 
doctrine is accepted as having three core elements. The necessity 
in question must be a prime necessity, the supplier of the necessity 
must be in a position of great and special advantage and the 
payment sought must be fair and reasonable. These requirements 
were ennunciated in the Privy Council decision of Levis. 5 2 
The prime necessities doctrine has the potential to overlap 
somewhat with the essential facilities doctrine in that both concern 
the granting of access to commodities for reasonable fees. However 
the prime necessities doctrine is broader in that it is open to 
anyone to instigate it against the supplier whereas in traditional 
essential facilities analysis only competitors may invoke the 
doctrine. However the ambit of the prime necessities doctrine is 
narrowed when it is considered that supply can only be required m 
the narrow situation where such supply is of "fundamental 
importance to the public."53 In the essential facilities context the 
facility must be essential for the competitor in that without access 
he must be unable to compete in the market, however, there is no 
overarching requirement that the facility concerned must be of 
fundamental importance to the public in general. Thus, in the past 
the prime necessities doctrine has been confined to electricity 
supply54, water supply55, wharf access56 and rubbish collection5 7 
whereas the essential facilities doctrine has applied to enable access 
to sports stadiums58, railway bridges59 and buildings in which local 
51 Cited in BP McAllister "Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest" (1929-
1930) 43 Harv L Rev 759. 
52 Minister of Justice for the Dominion of Canada v City of Levis [1919] AC 505 
53 Chastain v British Columbia Hydro & Power Authority (1972) 32 DLR (3d) 443,454. 
54 South Taranaki Electric Power Board v Patea Borough [1955] NZLR 954. 
55 Above note 52. 
56 De Portibus Maris cited in B P McAllister above note 51. 
57 Mayor,etc, of Auckland v The King (Mayor of Auckland) [1932] NZLR 1709. 
58 Fishman v Wirtz above note 27. 
I I 
fruit trade occured60 to name but a few. Further it seems that in 
order for a service to be regarded as a prime necessity there needs 
to be empowering legislation which places such service within the 
public domain. This appears to be an inherent characteristic 
throughout the prime necessities cases. This differs from the 
essential facilities doctrine where the issue regarding the facility 1s 
whether it is essential to the competitor seeking access. 
I I I THE NEW ZEALAND ESSENTIAL FACILITIES POSITION 
A Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 
1 The section 
There is the potential (and indeed it has been the practice to 
date) for essential facilities type cases to be brought under the 
auspices of the Commerce Act. The major way to date that such 
actions have been brought has been through section 36 of the Act. 
Section 36 is concerned with outlawing the "abuse" of a dominant 
position in a market. Section 36 provides that: 
No person who has a dominant position 10 a market shall use 
that position for the purpose of-
( a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other 
market; 
( b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in 
competitive conduct in that or any other market; 
( c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market. 
The section thus effectively provides that merely being in a 
dominant position results in no infringement of the Act, rather the 
crucial issue is whether such dominance has been used. 
Commentators have argued that the best way to interpret the 
section lies in reading "use" and the purposes in section 36) 1 )a)-c) 
together. Thus conduct that is not anti-competitive if engaged in by 
non-dominant firms, becomes so if it is conducted by dominant 
firms.61 In determining the party's purpose the Court will make an 
inference based on all the materials available to it. 
2 Section 36 and the essential facilitie doctrine compared 
Section 36 does however differ from the essential facilities 
doctrine in several ways. The essential facilities doctrine unlike the 
Commerce Act focuses on the "effect rather than purpose."62 That is 
the doctrine does not require an investigation into the monopolist's 
59 Terminal Railroad above note 23. 
60 Gamco v Providence Fruit and Produce Building Inc et al l 94 F 2d 484, First Circuit. 
61 Van Roy Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws (CCH, Auckland,1991) 153. 
62 Above note 16. 
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state of mind, the doctrine is concerned with more objective issues. 
Further, so long as a facility holder's purpose in denying the access 
to the customer is due to a legitimate business reason the doctrine 
cannot be raised. This could potentially differ from a Commerce Act 
action in that the Act provides in section 2(5)b) that where an 
anticompet1t1ve purpose is a "substantial" purpose a finding of 
anticompetitive intent can be easily made. Thus in the situation 
where a facility holder has a legitimate business reason for 
withholding access but has a substantial intent to act 
anticompetitively the Act will be breached, however the doctrine 
will not. 
Another distinction between the doctrine and section 36 is 
that the former bases actions from firms holding an "essential" 
facility which is a higher test than that of mere dominance. Section 
36 is also broader in that it does not prevent non-competitors 
using it as a basis of an action. This differs from the essential 
facilities doctrine in that the doctrine requires that the plaintiff be 
a competitor of the defendant before the doctrine be invoked. The 
underlying mischief which section 36 seeks to attack may be 
contrasted with one of interpretation of the doctrine. The doctrine 
has been argued to be primarily concerned with the situation 
where there is harm to a competitor. Vautier takes the view that 
this differs from section 36 which "as it stands appears to focus 
more on potential harm to an individual person, that on harm to 
overall competitive conduct as such."63 However as was argued 
above, while the doctrine does take strong cognisance of the harm 
which is being caused to a competitor, to be consistent with 
antitrust policy this cannot be regarded as the overall mischief 
which it seeks to attack. The doctrine should aim to prevent the 
reduction of competition in the market as a whole and not to 
protect inefficient competitors where such protection is not 
warranted. Thus this latter distinction may in fact be less apparent 
than it first appears. 
3 Case law 
The New Zealand courts have been faced with essential 
facilities type cases in the context of actions bought under section 
36 of the Commerce Act 1986. This section prohibits the use of a 
dominant position for the purpose of restricting or preventing 
competition in a market. The Ministry of Commerce has noted that 
most cases concerning essential facilities would come within this 
section of the Commerce Act.64 
63 Above note 13,7. 
64 Ministry of Commerce "Guarantee of Access to Essential Facilities" Wellington, December 
1989,13. 
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The first case to consider essential facilities in New Zealand 
was Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars .65 While 
the case found that competition law had been breached it was on 
the basis of statutory competition law as enshrined in section 36 
rather than the American espousal of the essential facilities 
doctrine per se. However this was an application of section 36 
"informed by the American essential facilities doctrine"66 in that 
Barker held that "exclusion from the market by means of gateway, 
prima facie indicates anti-competitive intention unless the 
exclusion can be explained with reference to reasonable 
constraints. "6 7 
The next major consideration of the essential facilities 
doctrine in New Zealand can be found in the case of Union 
Shipping. 68 There the High Court expressly hesitated to incorporate 
the American essential facilities doctrine into New Zealand law. It 
expressly laid out five reasons for such reluctance. It stated that 
careful adaption of American law was needed in order that 
distortion could be avoided also that New Zealand has a different 
statutory base for its competition law to the American Sherman Act 
from which the essential facilities doctrine is founded. Further 
given the lack of an American Supreme Court ruling on the doctrine 
the court was reluctant to apply it into New Zealand law. Also in 
light of the Australian approach in Queensland Wire 69 the court 
considered its reluctance to incorporate the doctrine to be further 
supported. The final justification for failing to import the common 
law doctrine into New Zealand law was that the court already had 
section 36 of the Commerce Act and this was sufficient to cover 
essential facility type situations, it not being the role of the court to 
import a common law doctrine, but rather to apply the Commerce 
Act. The court did not reject the value of the essential facilities 
doctrine out of hand however. It noted that "(w)hile we do not 
adopt and apply the doctrine as such, nor do we ignore help which 
it may offer in achieving some sensible resolution ... the American 
experience may give valuable insights, and assist assessment of 
potential section 36 solutions."7 o 
In 1990 at this point in New Zealand's essential facilities 
jurisprudence commentators were adopting the view that "it could 
65 Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars [1987] 2 NZLR 647. 
66 Mason "The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Section 36 of the Commerce Act" (LLM, 
Victoria Universitry of Wellington, 1990). 
67 Above note 65, 680. 
68 Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd & Another v Port Nelson Ltd CP 101/89 
69 Above note 18. 
70 Above note 68,101,645. 
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be said that New Zealand was developing its own essential facilities 
doctrine under the rubric of section 36 of the Commerce Act."71 
The most recent case discussing essential facilities in New 
Zealand is Telecom Communications. 72 This case "is a world first in 
that it is a a court system which is attempting to grapple with 
details of telecommunications access terms and conditions ... as, in 
all other countries there is a specific telecommunications regulator 
whose task it is to determine interconnection terms and 
conditions."73 The case centred around Clear's objection to paying 
the price that Telecom was seeking to charge it for access to its 
hard-wired telephone network. The action was bought as an alleged 
breach of section 36 of the Commerce Act. The High Court made no 
reference to the essential facilities doctrine in determining that it 
was unnecessary for Telecom to charge any of its customers an 
access fee. The Court of Appeal applied the Commerce Act to hold 
that Telecom was entitled to charge Clear a reasonable fee for the 
use of its service ( this would accord with a traditional essential 
facilities analysis). However the court neatly avoided the traditional 
difficulty in the essential facilities cases of determining the 
quantum of this figure by stating that that was a matter for the 
parties to resolve between themselves. On appeal to the Privy 
Council the Law Lords did not discuss the essential facilities 
doctrine but rather simply stated that while Telecom was entitled 
to charge a fee for access to its facility this was not to include super 
normal rent. The Privy Council took the view that the Commerce 
Act would prevent this from occuring in that Part IV of the Act 
contained provisions enabling the removal of monopoly amounts. 
The omission by the Privy Council or indeed any of the other lower 
courts is likely to reflect the judicial attitude that in New Zealand 
the essential facilities doctrine does not exist at common law but 
rather is to be used as a tool of analysis in the interpretation of 
section 36 of the Commerce Act. 
B Section 47 
1 The section 
Section 47 of the Act is designed to prohibit the occurence of 
certain business acquisitions where the acquisition will result in 
dominance in the market. Section 47 provides: 
71 Above note 66,87. 
72 Telecom Communications of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Comunications Ltd (1992) TCLR 
166; (1994) 5 TCLR 412 (CA); [ 1995] 1 NZLR 385 (PC); (1994) 6 TCLR 138 (PC). 
73 Pengilley "The Privy Council Speaks on Essential Facilities in New Zealand : What are 
the Australasian Lessons?" 26(3) Comp & Consumer Law Jnl. 
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No person shall acquire the assets of a business or shares if, as a 
result of the acquisition,-
(a) That person or another person would be, or would be likely to be, 
in a dominant position in a market; or 
(b) That person's or another person's dominant pos1t10n in a market 
would be, or would be likely to be, strengthened. 
The Commerce Commission's Guidelines relating to the application 
of the business acquisition prohibition state that "(a) business 
acquisition is unlikely to result in any person acqmnng or 
strengthening a dominant position in a market if behaviour in that 
market continues to be subject to significant constraints from the 
threat of market entry. "7 4 
In determining what these potential barriers could be the 
Commission lists "differences in access to raw materials, technology 
or capital and differences in access to distribution or "essential 
facilities."75 Thus as any essential facilities holder will not be 
subject to any barrier to entry into a market as they will already 
have a monopoly over the essential facility there is a possibility 
that should they attempt to undertake a merger their conduct could 
be prevented by the application of section 4 7. The Guidelines go on 
to further affirm that an essential facilities holder is likely to be 
regarded as being in a dominant position in a market (which any 
acquisition could potentially strengthen) by stating that "(a) person 
is in a dominant position in a market when it is in a position to 
exercise a high degree of market control. A person in a dominant 
position will be able to set prices or conditions without significant 
constraint by competitor or customer reaction."7 6 
2 Case law 
It is interesting to note that no essential facility type cases 
have been brought under this section to date. This may be a 
indication that essential facilities holders typically have such a 
monopoly position that they are not in the business of seeking to 
strengthen their position. This in itself may provide an argument as 
to the need for a common law essential facilities doctrine being 
enacted in some way into New Zealand law as arguably section 47 
does little to capture the behaviour of those holding essential 
facilities . 
74 Commerce Commission "Business Acquisition Guidelines - Exposure Draft 1995." 17 
75 Above note 74,18. 
76 Above note 74,19. 
IV THE HILMER COMMITTEE REPORT 
A The Traditional Position in Australia Concerning 
Essential Facilities 
1 Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
To date in Australia any case which could have fallen within 
an essential facilities framework has been brought as an action 
under section 46 of the Trade Practices Act 197 4 which focuses on 
the "purpose" of the conduct. However there does not exist any 
ability for a plaintiff to bring an action asserting a simple breach of 
the "essential facilities doctrine" in Australia. The cases arising 
under section 46 seem somewhat inconsistent as to whether 
"purpose" is to be assessed on an objective or subjective basis. In 
Pont Data77 the court held that "purpose was to be ascertained 
'subjectively' rather than 'objectively"' whereas in General 
Newspapers78 it was held that "the ultimate test is an objective 
test." However the focus of the Court's enquiry nonetheless centred 
around the purpose which the alleged anti competitive conduct was 
taken. Thus until the time of the Hilmer report it was the "purpose" 
(whether this is measured objectively or subjectively) which 
proved the most substantial stumbling block faced by plaintiffs in 
essential facility type scenarios. 
2 Case law 
As has been discussed above the essential facilities doctrine 
does not exist in Australia. The doctrine was purportedly rejected 
by the Australian Federal Court in Queensland Wire. 19 This case 
held that there were several major reasons as to why the essential 
facilities doctrine could not be applied to the case. 
Firstly, the doctrine was not readily accommodated as being 
within the terms of section 46 itself. Section 46 of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 is analogous to New Zealand's section 36. The 
criticism of the court that its section outlawing the abuse of a 
dominant position and the essential facilities doctrine are directed 
at different mischiefs is open to question. Pengilley suggests that 
both are designed to ensure "that a party can obtain market entry 
(and thus) compete."80 
The court further stated that as the doctrine formed a gloss 
on the Sherman Act it could not be imported into Australian law 
77 ASXOperations v Pont Data (1991) 13 ATPR 41-069 
78 General Newspapers (1992) 14 ATPR 41-165. 
79 Above note 18. 
80 Pengilley W "The Essential Facilities Doctrine and the Federal Court" Trade Practices 
Advertising and Marketing Law Bulletin 4 (May 1988) 57,59. 
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which did not have this specififc statute. This is arguably not a 
sufficiently substantial reason to reject the doctrine per se. 
One of the most overwhelming reasons for the court's 
rejection of the doctrine was that they could not see its limits. The 
court seemed to take this concern seriously implying that should 
the essential facility doctrine be accepted as valid it would be 
applicable to a case such as Queensland Wire . Many commentators 
have argued that this view is somewhat misguided. If the essential 
facilities doctrine were to be imported Queensland Wire would 
never have been a case where its application would have been 
warranted. 
The court also noted that if there was such a doctrine there 
was difficulty where the applicant was a customer in asserting the 
proposition. Commentators have in fact agreed with the court on 
this point which is a correct analysis of the scope of the doctrine(as 
can be seen from an examination of the elements of the doctrine 
above in section IIB. Commentators have asserted that this is yet 
another reason why the essential facilities doctrine should not have 
been applied in the case. 
The court further objected to the imposition of the doctrine 
stating that there would need to be further consideration of the 
"legitimate business purpose" doctrine. As discussed above in 
section IIB the court here fails to recognize that the two doctrines 
have traditionally been considered together and that all law is 
about the reconciliation of conflicting principles. In the essential 
facilities case these principles are reconciled such that the 
legitimate business purpose doctrine acts as a defence to the notion 
of essential facilities. 
B Overview of the Hilmer Committee Recommendations 
Pursuant to an agreement by the heads of Australian State 
Governments on the need for a comprehensive statement as to the 
basis and scope of Australian competition law policies and 
principles the Hilmer Committee was created. The Committee's 
report addressed competition law in general but made particular 
reference to the "essential facilities doctrine." 
The Committee expressed concerns it had about the ability of 
the courts to enforce specific performance orders and to set a 
reasonable price and other terms of access to essential facilities. In 
regard to this latter concern it noted that the repercussions of 
setting an incorrect access price could be substantial. The 
Committee held that " ... failure to provide appropriate protection to 
the owners of (essential) facilities has the potential to undermine 
It 
incentives for investment." 81 Investors will not be willing to invest 
in risky enterprises where there is a likelihood that the extra profit 
that their investment should potentially recoup in light of the 
heightened risk will be eliminated from them as access is granted 
to new players in the market. 
However the Committee noted the merits involved in having a 
type of essential facilities doctrine for certain industries. The 
industries they gave examples of included telecommunications 
networks, electricity transmission grids, rail tracks and airports. 
The view was adopted that as regards these industries competition 
would not be introduced in such markets absent a facilities 
doctrine. "In some markets the introduction of effective competition 
requires competitors to have access to facilities which exhibit 
natural monopoly characteristics and hence cannot be duplicated 
economically. "82 
As regards the industries that were considered"essential" in 
nature the view was adopted that a single access regime rather 
than specific industry regulation was the most efficient way of 
enforcing access. The Committee's approach was to advocate the 
establishment of an entirely new access regime outside of the scope 
of competition law. 
The Hilmer Committee recommended that one "economy-
wide" body should undertake the enforcement of the regime. Any 
decision concerning access was regarded as a decision that should 
be made by Government and thus it was the role of a 
Commonwealth Minister to determine circumstances in which an 
access order ought to be made. The Committee held that there were 
important public access issues at stake and thus it should be the 
role of a democratically elected decision-making authority to 
determine when access orders were to be made. In awarding such a 
decision-making power " (t)he Hilmer Committee was crystal clear 
in its determination to keep this particular area of dispute away 
from the courts."8 3 
To enable the Minister to make an adequately informed 
decision a national body known as the National Competition Council 
was to deliver an opinion to the Minister as to whether a service 
should be declared and thus fall within the Act. Before making such 
a recommendation the body was to ensure that the facility met 
vanous criteria These criteria were that : 
* access to the facility was to be essential for competition, 
81 Independent Committee of Inquiry National Competition Policy (Australian Government 
Printer, canberra, August 1993),248. 
82 Above note 81, 239. 
83 S Corones "The Hilmer Report and its Potential Implementation" 21 ABLR 451. 
* the making of an access order was to be in the public 
interest (In making a determination as to whether a matter could 
truly be regarded as within the public interest the Committee was 
to give due regard to: 
and * 
the significance of the industry in the national 
economy; and 
the expected impact that effective compet1t10n in 
that industry would have on the national economy.) 
that an access fee was decided giving due regard to the 
protection of a facility holder's legitimate interests. 
Once these criteria were met the Minister was to make a Ministerial 
declaration requiring a grant of access to the facility. However the 
Minister was to have the jurisdiction to elect to ignore their 
recommendation if he so wished. 
The Committee hoped that normally the facility holder and 
access seeker would be capable of agreeing on the terms of access 
and in particular a figure which allowed for reasonable 
compensation between themselves. It adopted the idea that in the 
absence of such an agreement, recourse could be made to the 
ACCC's arbitration skills to aid in the attainment by the parties of a 
consensus. It was then envisaged that such contract would be 
registered by the ACCC. However if one of the parties elected to 
appeal an appeal could be made to the Australian Competition 
Tribunal within 28 days was provided for and further appeal to the 
Federal Court. was provided for however this had to be on a 
question of law 
C The Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 
1 Overview 
On 20 July 1995 the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 was 
enacted in Australia. The CPRA "results from the acceptance in 
principle but with modifications"84 of the Hilmer Committee 
recommendations. It is in part IIIA of the CPRA that the 
Committee's conclusions concerning essential facilities are 
addressed. By accepting the establishment of the regime as a 
separate national access regime the Coalition of Australian 
Governments effectively accepted the Hilmer report's conclusion 
concerning essential facilities. The CPRA implicitly provides that as 
regards these facilities competition can only be promoted through 
84 ACCC Trade Practices Reporter ( CCH, Continually Updated) 10-000, 6,021 
preventing facility holders charging full market rental for access or 
preventing the denial of access.85 
The ACCC notes that the introduction of a statutory regime of 
general application is fairly novel. 86 The CPRA' s provisions 
concerning essential facilities seek to create some consistency and 
rationalization in relation to the operation of state, Commonwealth 
and private contractual arrangements concerning access according 
ot the ACCC. This is due to the fact that if a State or Territory 
regime is regarded as an effective regime access to the facility is to 
be determined in accordance with that state or territorial basis. 
8 7 
The ACCC notes that section 46 and the other sections of the 
Australian Trade Practices Act 197 4 are not diminished by the 
CPRA. Rather the Trade Practices Act continues to exist and run 
alongside the new Act. Thus Part IIIA of the CPRA in no way 
establishes a code. 8 8 
Part IIIA of the CPRA is divided into eight core divisions. 
Division one discusses preliminary issues. Declared services are 
discussed in division two and provision is made for access to them 
in division three. In division four a framework is established 
through which the Commission may decide whether or not to 
register a contract for a declared service. The implications of 
hindering a declared service are outlined in division five. Division 
six relates to non-declared services, for these services the service 
provider may undertake to provide access despite the fact that the 
service remains undeclared. Enforcement and remedy provisions 
are outlined in division seven and the last division concerns 
miscellaneous matters. 
2 The application of the CPRA - declaration of a service 
The CPRA applies only to services. Services are defined as 
" (a) the use of an infrastructure generally; 
(b) the handling or transporting of things such as goods/people; 
(c) a communications service or similar service." 
The CPRA however excludes from the definition of service: 
"(d) the supply of goods; or 
(e) the use of intellectual property;or 
(f) the use of a production process . 
except to the extent that these are an integral but subsidary part of the service.
" 
85 See clause 6(1) of the Inter-Governmental Competition Policy Agreement, ACCC Trade 
Practies Reporter above note 84, 140,211. 
86 Above note 84. 
87 For a diagramatical reflection of this see Appendix I. This diagram is taken from the 
ACCC above note 84. 
88 Above note 84, 6,021. 
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Thus, excluded services are outside the scope of the access regime, 
unless they are required by a declared service but only in an 
incidental fashion. 
The CPRA remains consistent with the recommendations of 
the Hilmer Committee in that it is the Minister whom has the role 
of declaring a service on recommendation of the National 
Competition Council 89 . Criteria for the recommendations of the NCC 
are established in sections 44F and 44G. These same criteria apply 
to the Minister's decision as to whether or not he will accept their 
views (section 44H). The criteria listed in these sections are 
essentially those outlined by the Committee, however the 
requirement that the service be of national importance has been 
dropped.90 Whether or not a service is declared is the central 
biggest issue under the CPRA in light of the fact that it is only to 
these declared services that access will be granted under the CPRA. 
The CPRA has no application to services which are not declared. 
Before a service may indeed be declared the Minister must be 
satisfied as to all of the factors specified. The Minister must believe 
that: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
and * 
a grant of access will cause the promotion of 
competition, 
that as regards the facility its duplication would be 
uneconomical, 
other parties' contractual rights will be protected, 
the access seeker is not going to become an owner of the 
facility without the consent of the access provider 
that costs in providing the said access will indeed be 
met by the access seeker. 
These criteria do not present alternatives, they must all be 
met. 
Any person may apply for a service to be declared and the 
Minister is also at liberty to instigate an opinion from the NCC. Once 
the Minister has decided whether or not a service should be 
declared his decision may be appealed to the Australian 
Competition Tribunal. In the event of such an appeal the situation 1s 
reconsidered rather than the Minister's decision being reviewed. 
The Act does not however prevent the advancement of a 
judicial review proceeding the right to which exists at common law. 
As noted by Taylor "judicial review is the product of the common 
law reflecting not the direct will of Parliament on who should do 
what, but the separate assessment by the Courts of what is needed 
for the good of society to (variously expressed) "control", 
89 Hereinafter the"NCC" 
90 See above 84, 6,082. 
"supervise", "keep within Parliament's instructions" the activities
 of 
government-related authorities. "91 Thus as the Court's jurisdicti
on 
depends on it maintaining the confidence of the people, such an 
inquiry is necessarily limited to whether the decision maker has
 
made the decision within the ambit of his/her power. The Court 
cannot substitute its own decision regarding the matter at hand. 
Lord Diplock has stated the tradittional grounds on which an act
ion 
can be based as "illegality, irrationality, and procedural 
impropriety. " 92 This allows the Court a relatively small ambit 
within which to assess an executive decision. 
3 Gaining access to a declared service 
Obtaining access will result either when the facility holder 
and plaintiff agree, or, after an arbitration process supervised by
 
the Commission occurs. Thus adopts the Committee's 
recommendation is adopted. If the parties agree, they may register 
a contract with the Commission at its discretion. On registration o
f 
such a document it has the same legal weight as a declaration of
 the 
Commission. 
A facility holder may avoid these provisions by making 
undertakings with which the Commission concurs, however, this 
relates only to services that have not yet been declared. In 
determining whether to accept any proposed undertaking the 
Commission must take account of the same factors as it is requir
ed 
to when arbitrating an access issue.9 3 
The traditional problem in essential facilities cases of setting a 
reasonable price for access to the facility only arises under the 
CPRA where the parties disagree. In this event the CPRA provide
s 
for the matter to be resolved by arbitration. 
If the parties elect to have their dispute arbitrated privately 
at the conclusion of the arbitration they will enter into a contract
 in 
accordance with the private commercial arbitrator's findings . Th
is 
will subsequently be registered with the Commission at which p
oint 
the contract will becomes as binding legally as if it were a 
determination by the Commission. To ensure that the result of th
e 
private arbitration agreement accords with competition law poli
cy 
in general and is fair to the parties the Commission is granted th
e 
authority to refuse to register the contract if it does not meet 
certain requirements. These requirements are that the contract 
be 
in the public interest and be fair to the interests of the parties. 
Alternatively, the parties may elect for the Commission to 
arbitrate their dispute. In the event of this occuring the Commis
sion 
91 Taylor GDS Judicial Review in New Zealand ( Wellington, Butterworths, 1991) 3. 
92 Council of Civil Service v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (HL) 410-411. 
93 These factors are outlined below. 
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is required to take account of vanous factors. These factors 
include: 
* the legitimate business interests and investment of the 
owner/operator; 
* the direct costs of providing access; 
* requirements concerning the safe operation of the 
facility; 
* the interests of those who have rights to use the service 
and * the public interest in general. 
The determination has a broad ambit and may concern any matter 
relating to the access. 
D Analysis of the CPRA 
1 Application of the CPRA 
The CPRA is novel in that it sets out a separate framework 
detailing how decisions regarding its application should be made 
and decisions as to how terms on which access should be granted 
should be determined. The CPRA has sought to overcome the 
difficulty that 
regulation attempts to emulate the pncmg and output effects that 
would occur if the industry were structurally capable of functioning 
competitively. In contrast..., antitrust provides a general, background 
regulation for the vast majority of the economy's industries where 
competition is possible. Antitrust seeks not to replace or emulate 
market forces, but to remove private, unnatural obstacles to the 
operation of market forces.9 4 
While not seeking to regulate per se, the CPRA principally 
envokes a regulatory framework to enforce antitrust principles. The 
CPRA effectively provides that the courts (the traditional enforcers 
of antitrust) are to be a place of last resort and that prima facie a 
determination as to whether the CPRA should apply to a facility is 
to be made by a Minister with terms of access being determined in 
the event of a dispute by the Commission. In this way the courts 
only have a role if either of the above party's decisions are being 
appealed. Thus the courts can only become involved where the 
decision making processes of a Minister do not accord with 
principles of justice under a judicial review action, or, where a 
question of law is raised in regard to the terms of access. 
Thus the CPRA adopts the approach that while antitrust ideas 
are important they are best enforced by a regulatory body. 
Nonetheless industry regulation as a principle is not applied under 
94 Rule C "Antitrust and Bottleneck Monopolies; The Lessons of the AT&T Decree" 
Remarks before the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, October 1988, 3. 
the CPRA. The CPRA is not seeking to simulate the way the market 
would operate should it be capable of functioning efficiently. 
Rather, it is merely seeking to eradicate behaviour which has a 
detrimental impact on the competitive functioning of markets 
inherently capable of functioning competitively. 
( a) Should regulators rather than Ministers decide when the 
CPRA should apply ? 
Dispute has surrounded how exactly the executive arm of 
Government should decide whom is to come within the ambit of the 
CPRA. This dispute has centred around whether Ministers or 
regulatory bodies (such as the ACCC) are best capable of making 
decisions as to when a service should be declared. 
(i) Advantages of a Ministerial Assessment 
The Committee adopted the view that as access to essential 
facilities was a matter of national economic concern the decision as 
to whether a service was to fall within the access framework was to 
be made independently by an elected Minister. Such an approach 
was seen to accord with democratic principles. 
A further advantage in Ministerial decisions on the issue 1s 
the ability for Ministers to allow for nationwide consistency as to 
what facilities are to be treated as essential and which are not. 
Arguably Ministers develop skill and knowledge based on their 
previous decisions when making such assessments. Further 
Ministerial decisions can be made speedily and thus changes in 
market conditions can be readily accounted for. 
(ii) Disadvantages of a Ministerial Assessment 
The view that Ministers are the best decision makers in terms 
of service declaration has been questioned by Pengilley who adopts 
the approach that if so, there is no reason for other competition law 
decisions not to be made the government. Pengilley, thus argues 
that the new law, involves some inconsistency in that the ACCC are 
empowered to decide various issues of a competition law nature 
which arguably also involve issues of national significance. Thus 
Pengilley argues that the fact that a competition law issue is of 
national significance does not per se require it to be determined by 
a governmental body. 
The initial rationale for Ministers to make service 
declarations was that this was seen to accord with democracy in 
that matters of national significance were at stake. However, the 
requirement on the Minister to consider public interest issues 
1S 
recommended by the Committee does not seem to have been 
accepted into the legislation. The criteria to which the Minister 
must give regard when deciding on service declarations does not 
include the requirement that services be of national significance. 
The change apparent in the Act takes account of comments 
made that "an 'essential facility' does not have to be significant to 
the national economy for a denial of access to amount to a misuse of 
market power. "95 In the traditional American exposition of the 
doctrine so long as a facility was essential to a market any denial of 
access to that facility amounted to a breach of the doctrine. There 
was, however, no additional requirement that the market be of 
significance to the national economy. The absence of this secondary 
requirement made it possible for cases such as Fishman96 to fall 
within the essential facilities doctrine as although access to an 
American sports stadium was not a matter of national significance 
the access facility holder nonetheless was in the position of 
preventing access to a facility which was limiting competition and 
reducing efficiency. It seems that given the purpose of the doctrine 
such a decision should be commended as it allows for the mischief 
at which the doctrine is aimed to be punished. 
While there may exist merit in dropping the requirement that 
Ministers take account of the national significance of the industry 
concerned when determining whether a service declaration be 
made, the case for Ministers making the initial service declaration 
due to the national significance of the issues at stake is somewhat 
weakened. 
Pengilley further argues that Ministers are not more 
likely to be neutral arbiters of disputes than courts or regulatory 
bodies. Ministers have the potential to make decisions based on the 
political pressures they face. This relates to public choice theory
9 7 
that politicians are essentially motivated by political concerns and 
will engage in rent seeking behaviour. As has been noted in New 
Zealand but which is arguably a universal comment "Ministers are 
likely to face considerable pressure to declare an essential facility 
to advance private interests. These situations do not necessarily 
coincide with the promotion of the competitive process or the 
overall public interest."98 Also, this may have an adverse impact on 
investor confidence in the market as different political ideologies 
are arguably reflected. Thus investors wishing to make long range 
investment decisions may have difficulty in knowing whether the 
95 Above note 79, 39. 
96 Above note 27. 
97 C K Rowley Public Choice (Elgat, Aldershot, 1993). 
98 NZ Ministry of Commerce Review of the Commerce Act,1986 : Reports and Decisions 
(August 1989) 8. 
company they wish to invest in will or will not have access to a 
facility in the long term. 
A potential problem also lies in that mere lobbying strength 
may become the true determinant of whether a service is regar
ded 
as being one to which the CPRA should apply regardless of the 
underlying intent of the decision maker. This lobbying could occ
ur 
at various distinct stages. 
Under the initial Committee recommendations there was the 
potential for lobbying to be the trigger that the NCC responded to
 in 
instigating an inquiry and providing a Minister with advice as to
 
whether a service should be declared. However, as the CPRA ma
kes 
express provision for any person to initiate a request that a serv
ice 
be declared this lobbying may not have the same effect as initia
lly 
feared. There is some merit in this concern however in that the 
declaration process normally begins with the government initiat
ing 
an inquiry through the NCC. Further although the CPRA in this w
ay 
does not raise issues of standing which an interested party must
 
circumvent prior to seeking an access declaration, the parties 
relative resources may causes inequities in their ability to asser
t 
their legal rights. The concern may have some substance in that 
the 
relative difference between parties resources could be substanti
al 
in the essential facilities context. 
There may however be stronger potential for lobbying 
requests made to the NCC as to whether the access regime shoul
d 
apply to determine the outcome of their inquiry. Further lobbyin
g 
made to the Minister to either accept or reject the NCC's advice m
ay 
have some impact. These latter stages of lobbying are of particu
lar 
concern in the essential facilities context as those whom hold acc
ess 
to informational and economic resources regarding the value of 
the 
facility are likely to be the facility holders. These players will be
 in 
a position of significant bargaining strength relative to the acces
s 
seekers. Thus concerns of governmental capture may become 
particularly apposite as the imbalance of resources may ensure 
that 
information concerning one side's position is more readily availa
ble 
and therefore receives more weight in the evaluation process. A
s 
the Ministry of Commerce has noted in its consideration of the 
appropriate role of essential facilities in the New Zealand context,
 if 
a designation was required to be made by a Minister as to whet
her 
a facility is essential this "could occur through pressures from 
private interests which do not necessarily coincide with the 
promotion of the competitive process or the overall public 
interest."99 
A further criticism of allowing Ministers rather than 
regulatory authorities to decide who should come within the am
bit 
99 Ministry of Commerce above note 64. 
of the Act is that Ministerial decisions may be more difficult to 
appeal. A regulator has been argued to be a better decision making 
body than a Minister of the Crown in light of the fact that a 
regulatory body tends to be made up of more than one person 
while Ministers tend to act as individuals. While not a universal 
truth decisions made by groups are likely to be more carefully 
considered and to accord with principles of natural justice.loo 
Decisions made by Ministers can only be reviewed at common law 
if principles of natural justice are not adherred to when the 
decision is made. 101 The substance of a Minister's decision 
however is a matter for his discretion and cannot be questioned by 
the courts if the only basis for objection is a disagreement with the 
Minister's view. Such a position does not provide a sufficient basis 
to ground a judicial review action. The constitiutional doctrine of 
the separation of powers requires that the judiciary is not 
empowered to second guess a Minster's decision. 
In this regard it is interesting to note that the CPRA makes 
provision for the facility holder or plaintiff to seek a review of a 
Ministerial decision through the forum of the Australian 
Competition Tribunal. This is not a part of the judicial system but is 
also part of the executory arm of the government. Thus the CPRA 
does impose some check on the executive's power but this comes 
internally from the executive itself. As such the value of this check 
may again be arguably somewhat limited as the executive arm 
which may be inclined not to criticize Ministerial decisions as it will 
not be in its rational self interest to do so. Whereas judicial tenure 
is not tied to political concerns funding for agencies like the ACCC 
comes from the government, that is Ministers decide the issue. Thus 
even this small check on administrative power may in reality be 
somewhat limited. 
(b) Should the Judiciary rather than Ministers make declaration 
decisions ? 
There has been some debate as to whether it should be the 
executive who determines what services should be considered to be 
declared services within the CPRA. As was discussed above the 
CPRA provides a clear definition of what a "service" is but leaves it 
to the Minister to determine what is to be regarded as a declared 
service in light of certain factors. Some have argued that this latter 
decision should best be made by the judiciary. The Hilmer 
Committee noted that judicial procedures in enforcing the CPRA are 
100 Taylor GDS above note 91; Crane Peter An Introduction to Administrative 
Law (New 
York, Clarendon Press, 1992). 
101 Above note 91. 
more accessible, speedier and have more precedential authority 
than determinations made by Ministers. However despite this, t
he 
election was made that Ministers should be responsible for decid
ing 
the circumstances in which the CPRA should apply in light of the
 
national significance that issues of service declaration were seen
 to 
have. 
The problem may be that governmental policy may not be 
reflected by judicial decisions in certain circumstances. Providin
g 
the same list of factors for the judiciary to consider rather than 
the 
government Minister does not guarantee that governmental poli
cy 
may be adherred to. Although factors could be enacted in more 
detail there would remain scope for judicial interpretation. 
Further, Rule argues that in the context of determining 
requisite access conditions a constitutional cost is incurred in 
allowing courts to establish access conditions, as such a 
determination is best made by the executive, which is a separate
 
arm of the government. It is argued that it is inefficient for the 
courts to undertake this function because there are informationa
l 
costs in transmuting information from government to the judicia
ry 
as our constitutional system is such that the courts are well 
insulated from the government. However arguably in the context
 of 
simply determining to which services the regime should apply t
he 
judiciary could be well used. There is arguably not the same lev
el 
of information required in determining whether or not a service 
1s 
essential as there is in determining what the content of access 
conditions. Also, it may be possible for the legislature to ensure 
that 
the judiciary correctly interpreted the legislation by specifically 
legislating in the case where the judiciary did not enable legisla
tive 
intentions to be performed. Further the courts throughout all ar
eas 
of law are required to interpret Parliament's intent. Competition
 
law is in some senses no different to other law and does not hav
e 
peculiar policy considerations requiring it to be determined by t
he 
executive. Indeed in the traditional essential facilities cases the 
courts were required to interpret which facilities were essential 
without any guidance as to which factors should be considered. 
Competition law has well established overarching policies such a
s 
the promotion of efficiency which do not change frequently. 
Whether a service should be declared (that is, considered essent
ial) 
may not change frequently, thus, there may be less need for the
 
executive to be involved than where the terms of access to the 
facility are being determined. Thus a strong case can be made fo
r 
the judiciary, who are less likely to be captured by interest grou
ps 
to make service declarations. The policy considerations militating
 
against the judiciary determining access conditions are not so 
relevant to the initial issue of service declaration. 
2 Enforcement - determining the terms of access 
( a) The benefits of regulatory enforcement 
The delegation of regulatory detail to a regulatory authority 
has advantages both over a totally court based system and a 
system whereby certain monopolists find themselves subjected 
to 
price control from time to time. 
It would seem accurate to suggest that a single regulator 
policing an access regime allows that regulator to develop 
specialized skills as relates to its function. This is a particular 
concern in the essential facilities area where the skills required 
to 
enforce the doctrine to enhance efficiency are great. There is a n
eed 
for a regulator to understand what terms are fair and how acces
s 
can best be granted (assuming that, as in the CPRA, it is the 
function of the regulator to aid the parties in their determination
 of 
what access terms are required). 
Further, a regulatory authority may develop economies of 
scale as that body is able to develop economies of scale and emp
loy 
those with skills specialized to dealing with access issues. This is 
an 
advantage over having specific price control in specialized 
industries where the knowledge necessary to determine access 
which applies to all industries is paid for again and again by a 
multitude of regulatory authorities. Such a system would use 
society's and taxpayer's resources inefficiently. 
Another advantage of having one central regulatory body 
established is that given requisite resources it will be capable of
 
instigating its own enquiries from time to time. This could be 
particularly valuable in an essential facilities context where ther
e is 
the potential for the facility holder's monopoly power to be so g
reat 
that a potential access seeker can not develop sufficient economi
c 
resources to enable it to fund an action seeking access. Should a 
regulatory body have the legal ability to investigate the practices
 of 
essential facilities holders the costs of any action undertaken by 
an 
essential facilities access seeker would be lessened as much of it
s 
research work would be complete in that it would have an 
informational monopoly over the operation of the facility. The A
ct 
does not make specific provision for the NCC to carry out such an
 
inquiry at present. 
(b) Court Administration 
(i) Difficulties 
Most criticism that surrounds the essential facilities doctrine 
centers around the difficulties faced by the court in determining
 
.30 
access conditions. 102 Several commentators have outlined crucial 
difficulties with the court determining access prices and conditions. 
The Committee seems to have taken heed of many of these 
criticisms in electing to prevent the courts in interfering with issues 
of access terms. Rather, the commission elected to allow parties to 
prima facie determine the terms of access to an essential facility 
between themselves, or, in the alternative appeal to the arbitration 
skills of the Commission. 
Pricing 
Rule adopts the view that it is "practically impossible" for the 
court to determine a reasonable price of access. Duncan's view that 
a facility holder holds an informational monopoly over the costs of 
the facility further supports the view that a court assessment is 
difficult. I 03 This informational imbalance creates further difficulties 
in that courts do not have access to resources allowing them to 
correctly estimate the marginal cost of production or to determine 
the correct spreading of fixed costs. 
In the Pont Data I 04 case the Federal Court was asked to 
determine what an appropriate supply price would be for the 
supply of information from the Australian Stock Exchange to Pont 
Data. The action was raised under section 46 it being alleged that 
there was no cost justification for ASXO charging Pont Data a price 
different to that which it was charging its subsidary.
105 The Federal 
Court sought to determine a price "designed to obtain broad and 
substantial justice between the parties." 106 Given the circumstances 
the court considered that this should be the supply price that had 
been negotiated between the parties prior to their dispute. The 
problem raised by the case is that there is nothing in the 
negotiations to show that this did not incorporate monopoly profits 
and that it was indeed an efficient price. Further the Court's 
approach does not allow us to determine how profits could be 
assessed where negotiations between the parties had not occurred. 
Court Resources 
102 Rule C above note 94. 
103 A Duncan "Natural Monopolies and the Commerce Act" NZIER Working Pap
er 89/10 
(1989). 
104 ASX Operations v Pont Data above note 77. 
105 As recognised by the Commission where a price difference is due to savings in
 the cost of 
manufacture, distribution, sale or bulk order deliveries no action under section 46
 may 
stand. Australian Trade Practices Binder , above note 84 3,834. 
I 06 Above note 77, 52,068 
The view adopted here is that the courts lack specialized 
resources to enable effective regulation. That courts are arguably 
not equipped to deal with ongoing, evolutionary decision-making 
necessary to regulate prices in an industry subject to constant 
changes in consumer preferences. It is argued that making trade-
offs inherent in regulation is a political task and thus there are 
constitutional costs in breaching the doctrine of the separation of 
powers. These costs arise because there is inefficiency created m 
the governmental system by the courts having to obtain 
information from Ministers concerning the intentions of 
government and changing governmental policies. The argument lies 
that as regulatory bodies are part of the executive these costs are 
reduced when regulatory agencies seek to determine governmental 
information concerning access terms as there are fewer barriers to 
the transferral of information. 
Court Orders 
The enforcement of a regulatory type order that is made in an 
essential facilities case is arguably difficult for a court to enforce. 
Such orders differ significantly from traditional court awards of 
damages and specific performance. Access condition orders differ 
in that they need to be flexible and take into account changing 
market conditions (Shirtcliffe includes inflation and consumer 
preferences within these changing conditions. l 07) The view here is 
that it is inefficient to require interested parties to bring lengthy 
court proceedings rather than allowing a regulatory authority the 
power to simply change the terms of access to fit with altering 
market conditions. 
(ii) Benefits of court enforcement 
The judicial determination of access terms may be viewed as 
advantageous in that the judiciary is less likely to be the subject of 
interest group capture that a regulatory body. As noted by 
Shirtcliffe, Ratner has argued that courts are less likely to succumb 
to capture than regulatory bodies108. The basis on which capture 
theory rests is that given certain parties greater access to economic 
resources and information they have a greater ability to subvert 
justice in that they stand assured that their views will be heard 
I 07 Above note 16,44. 
I08Ratner J "Should There Be An Essential Facility Doctrine ?" (1988) 21 Univ Cali£ Davis L 
Rev,327 
while the smaller players face a potentially greater loss in 
attempting to gather information to state their case. I 09 
Such concerns are particularly relevant to essential facilities 
type cases as there is likely to be a substantial imbalance in the 
facility holder's favour of such resources, this gives them the 
potential to further maintain their monopoly. 
Interest groups may attempt to dominate the legislature and 
ensure that their wishes are enshrined in legislation by rewardi
ng 
the legislature with the promise of their votes in any on-coming
 
election. A judiciary whose tenure is not tied to such considerati
ons 
is in this way above falling prey to the wishes of interest groups
 as 
was discussed above. However independent judges do have 
additional value to interest groups because of their ability to 
enforce a statute based on its initial policy regardless of the 
current legislative view. Judges effectively act as a check to ens
ure 
that any legislative concession which an interest group managed 
to 
initially attain from a legislature remains enforceable whether o
r 
not that legislature remains in power. This provides an additiona
l 
incentive to interest groups to lobby while a bill is being consid
ered 
before the house. 
As Posner notes having an independent judiciary has 
economic benefits in that the rule of law is maintained. This is 
advantageous as if the judicial interpretation of a statute can be 
tied to the whims of the legislature there is the potential for a 
judiciary to effectively nullify a statute which is inefficient . Any
 
lack of consistency in the law may occur which may cause a lack
 of 
certainty for business in the context of a statute regulating 
competition law.110 This is one of the reasons why the Rule of La
w 
has economic value. 
In the context of the CPRA it may thus be assumed that 
should a judiciary be faced with the issue as to what access 
conditions should be granted to the facility, it will be capable of 
making an independent assessment of the situation regardless o
f 
interest group pressure. Such analysis is also applicable to whet
her 
a service should initially be declared for the purposes of the CPR
A. 
V ESSENTIAL FACILITIES IN THE NEW ZEALAND CONTEX
T 
A Does New Zealand Need An Essential Facilities Doctrine? 
As discussed above New Zealand does not have an essential 
facilities doctrine at present, however it does have a prime 
necessities doctrine. 
109 Olson M The Logic of Collective Action (Schcken, New York,1971). 
1 lOPosner R above note 6 , 53. 
The major reasons for rejecting an essential facilities doctrine 
to date has been that there was a lack of clear precedent as to the 
true scope of the doctrine. This remains somewhat true today. 
However in the ARA 1 1 L decision Barker J seems to have placed 
additional reliance on the rejection made of the doctrine in 
Queensland Wire 112. As discussed above that case arguably does 
not cover a true essential facilities scenario. 
If an essential facilities doctrine were to be adopted into New 
Zealand's common law added protections would be available to 
competitors of monopolistic entities. Given the recent deregulation 
and privatisation of many of New Zealand's State Owned Enterprises 
perhaps the importation of such a doctrine would prevent those 
facility holders which already hold substantial bottleneck 
monopolies from exploiting these to the detriment of efficiency and 
competition in markets. Such privatisation is well recognised as 
creating "acute problems in the context of natural monopolies"l 13 
Thus further protection may be needed to ensure that anti-
competitive access prevention does not hinder the operation of a 
fully competitive market and cause the associated detriments. 
Arguably however most anti-competitive access prevention 
by an essential facilities holder would come within section 36 of the 
Commerce Act. However the essential facilities doctrine would 
capture the situation that the CPRA would not , where the facility 
holder does not have the "purpose" of restricting a competitor's 
entry into the market but nevertheless this is the effect. This is due 
to the fact that "purpose" is one of the major hurdles which any 
competitor must overcome in proving that section 36 has been 
breached. This however is likely to be a fairly limited circumstance. 
The traditional concern regarding the adoption of the doctrine, 
that it is difficult for the courts to determine the terms of access 
inherent in an essential facilities case, remains true. A recent 
illustration of the difficulty which the New Zealand courts have 
encountered in setting an appropriate price for access can be seen 
in the renowned case of Telecom and Clear. 
In that case the Privy Council has recently invoked the 
Baumol-Willig rule as the best means of determining a supply price. 
This case however was brought under Section 36, this is relevant to 
the issue of pricing in that their Lordships noted that it was not 
appropriate to deal with a proceeding brought under section 36 into 
a way of regulating monopoly rents. The prima facie concern of 
section 36 is that exclusionary conduct is outlawed rather than that 
monopolistic pricing is prohibited. The Privy Council, however, did 
111 Above note 65. 
112 Above note 17. 
113 DB Robertson above note 9,100. 
determine that the correct way for Telecom to charge Clear for 
access to its facility was to invoke the Baumol-Willig rule. This was 
despite the High Court's previous finding that "The court is not a 
regulatory agency. We cannot pursue investigations into ... (w)hether 
Telecom' s operations are conducted in an inefficient manner. "11
4 
The Baumol-Willig rule allowed the facility holder (Telecom)' I 5 to 
charge a price that allowed it to recoup monopoly rents from 
inefficiencies in its operation and from profits in excess of a 
reasonable return on its investment. I l 6 
There are two major criticisms of this rule. The first is that 
the price may contain monopoly rents. If Telecom had initially had 
monopoly profits in its line rental these would still be recoverable 
after the imposition of the rule. Secondly the criticism lies that even 
if the price did not contain monopoly rents it would have been set 
in a monopoly market and in that sense would have been a 
monopoly price.117 Arnold notes that these concerns have merit in 
that "the existence of monopoly rents is of course an inefficiency 
which competition is intended to cure, not perpetuate."
118 However 
Arnold takes the view that the Baumol- Willig rule may be the best 
that the court can do in the circumstances. He notes that "the 
difficulty is that there is no mechanism for identifying the 
"competitive price", because there is no basis for identifying the 
appropriate "competitive" mark up.1 19 Further Arnold notes that 
the "Courts are not equipped to consider whether particular costs 
are efficient or inefficient costs." 120 This has been a strong reason 
for courts to traditionally shy away from the importation of the 
essential facilities doctrine into the law. Alternatively in the past, 
particularly in America the courts have invoked the doctrine only 
to refuse to make a determination as to what the price of access 
l !4 Telecom Communications of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communicationss Ltd (
1992) 2 
TCLR 166 
115 This assumes that the facility was the Public Service Telecommunications Ne
twork over 
which Telecom held a monopoly position. 
116 The rule enabled Telecom to charge "the average incremental cost of to Teleco
m of 
providing the network plus the revenue Telecom would have received had it suppl
ied 
the service to the Clear customers less the cost saved by Telecom by reason of Clear 
providing and handling and calls to or from a Clear customer over the sector from
 the 
interconnection with Telecom's network and the Clear customer, and vice versa." 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd (1994) 6 TCL
R 
138,146. 
1 l 7 Arnold "The Courts and the Pricig of Access to Essential Facilities - The 'Old
" Law and 
Economics at Work?" (1995) 1 NZBLQ 123,133. 
118 Above note 117,135. 
119 Above note 117,136. 
120 Above note 117,140. As an illustration of this point Arnold cites Pengilley '
1Misuse of 
Market Power: Present Difficulties - Future Problems" (1994) 2 Trade Pract LJ 27,4
2 and 
in particular the decision of ASX Operations Pty Ltd Pont Data v Australia Pty Lt
d 
(1990)97 ALR 513; (1991)100 ALR 125 (Fed CA). 
3 S 
should be. 121 such a decision can be of little practical benefit to the 
parties. 
Thus it may be that New Zealand should maintain the current 
stance that an essential facilities doctrine not be imported into the 
common law. 
B Should New Zealand Enact an Essential Facilities Provision into 
the Commerce Act ? 
In view of the judicial reluctance to adopt a common law 
essential facilities doctrine there nonetheless remains the potential 
for a specific provision prohibiting the denial of access by an 
essential facility holder. This could be done either through the 
amendment of section 36 or through adding an additional provision 
to the Commerce Act. 
1 A Section 36 Amendment ? 
In August 1989 the Ministry of Commerce stated that it 
believed that section 36 of the Commerce Act would be "relied upon 
as the basis for guaranteeing access to essential facilities in 
appropriate circumstances." 122 In a further paper of December 
1989 the view was further propounded by the Ministry that there 
was no need to amend section 36 and that it was the best means of 
ensuring that denial of access to essential facilities was covered. 
As has been noted above however l 23, there do exist 
differences between the essential facilities doctrine and section 36. 
In particular that the former covers the situation where the facility 
holder did not have the purpose of denying access to his facility but 
nonetheless this was the effect of his actions. 
It is interesting to note that Dr Bollard adopted the view m 
the August 1989 review document's commentary that 
administrative listing as to whether a facility was indeed essential 
would be difficult as this was likely to fluctuate in view of the 
constantly changing market conditions. Thus the best way of 
determining whether a facility was indeed essential is to allow the 
courts to make such a determination on a case by case basis.
124 Any 
section enacted within the Commerce Act would no doubt adopt the 
same approach. 
12 I Consolidated Gas Co of Florida above note 49. 
122 Ministry of Commerce above note 98. 
123 See above analysis III THE NEW ZEALAND ESSENTIAL FACILITIES POSITION -
A Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 
124 This may be well contrasted with the Australian Act where it is Ministerial discretion
 
that has been deemed to be the best tool in determining which facilities are to be 
regarded as essential. This brings its own problems as previously discussed. 
It is important to note that if section 36 is simply to be 
amended it will be the Courts whom have the role of determining 
what the reasonable terms of access are to be. The Commission has 
no power under section 36 to grant authorisations and thus cannot 
become involved in determining access conditions. Requiring the 
court to determine what the conditions of access should be has been 
a traditional concern of the doctrine as has been discussed in depth 
above 125 . In view of this if an amendment is to be made to the 
Commerce Act it may be better for this to be encoded in a separate 
section. 
2 An Alternative Amendment within the Commerce Act ? 
The Commerce Act 1986 which states its purpose as being 
"the promotion of competition within markets." While the Act 
provides for certain circumstances in which public benefit 
considerations may outweigh this concern (as is seen in light of the 
authorisation procedures taken under the Act) these are 
nevertheless the exception to the general policy stated. The Act 
thus, implicitly makes the aim of competition law in New Zealand 
the promotion of economic efficiency .126 This adopts the premise 
that "society' s resources are best allocated in a competitive market 
where rivalry between firms ensures maximum efficiency in the 
use of resources."127 The Ministry of Commerce has observed that 
"competition causes efficient firms to prosper at the expense of 
inefficient ones. Increasing the number of firms in the industry 
permits owners to identify substandard performance and reward 
performance on the basis of inter-firm comparisons. [I]ncreasing 
the number of firms enhances the variety of experimental 
innovations that firms undertake and increases the opportunities 
for firms to learn from one another." 12 8 Thus the Ministry adopts 
the view that any time competition is reduced disbenefits are 
viewed as resulting. This is why our Commerce Act imposes some 
restrictions on the behaviour of monopolists viewed as decreasing 
competition. 
In light of the view adopted in this paper that the goal of the 
essential facilities doctrine is to protect competitors rather than 
protecting competition necessarily I 29 there seems to exist an 
125 See the analysis above II THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE B The Essential 
Requirements of the Doctrine - 6 The remedy is administrable 
126 Arnold T above note 117. 
127 Tru Tone Ltd v Festival Records [1988] 2 NZLR 352,358. 
128 New Zealand Ministry of Commerce and the Treasury Regulation of Access to Vertically 
Integrated Natural Monopolies - A Discussion Paper (Wellington, August 1995) 17. 
129 Above analysis - II THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE - A The Jurisprudential 
Basis of the Doctrine 
inherent inconsistency with enacting an essential facilities section 
into the Commerce Act. 
Further if such a section were enacted the existence of section 
26 of the Act and the potential for regulatory capture enters the 
debate to swing the argument towards favouring the establishment 
of a separate access regime. This is because section 26 provides for 
the Commerce Commission to take into consideration any 
governmental policies transmitted to them in writing by the 
Minister. This section does not require that the Commission become 
mere Ministerial puppets in that the governmental policies are not 
to override their decision making powers. "The Commission is 
required only to have regard to such statements in reaching its 
decisions." 130 However there will nevertheless remain a greater 
potential than where no section exists for the Commission to wish to 
fall in line with Ministerial interest, which in itself may be 
determined by Ministerial vote seeking behaviour. This is a concern 
as ministers are more likely to receive greater benefits from facility 
holders and thus competitors interests and the interests of 
competition generally may not be promoted due to the capture 
process that has occured. 
C Does New Zealand Require a Separate Access Regime? 
It may be concluded that, on balance, the problems inherent 
in the courts determining the terms of access militate towards the 
rejection of a common law essential facilities doctrine becoming 
enshrined in New Zealand law of its own accord. Further it has been 
determined that there is in aggregate a greater disbenefit in 
enacting an essential facilities provision into the Commerce Act 
than warrants such action. The question however remains whether 
New Zealand should nonetheless, invoke a separate access regime 
falling outside the scope of our Commerce Act, as Australia has 
done. 
1 In light of the analysis of the Australian Act how could an 
access regime best be formulated ? 
In determining how an essential facilities access regime could 
best be established the Australian approach leads to valuable 
insights. 
In analysing the CPRA this paper has determined that as 
regards the issue of whom the appropriate body is to determine 
whether a facility should fall within the regime a Ministerial 
decision is not necessarily best. This conclusion is reached in light of 
130 Re : New Zealand Kiwifruit Exporters Association (inc) new Zealand Kiwifruit 
Coo/stores Association Limited (1989) 2 NZBLC (Com) 104,485 D No 221 15 September 
1988 104,494. 
the fact that democracy does not truly require that an elected 
person decide access issues . The mischief of anticompetitive 
conduct may be present whether or not the industry concerned is 
of importance to the national economy. Further Ministers have the 
potential to take political concerns into account rather than truly 
focussing on the issue they have been asked to resolve. Thus an 
access regime in which it was the role of the judiciary to determine 
whether any industry should fall within the scope of the Act would 
be meritorious. This would also increase the level of certainty 
necessary for investor confidence in the market as previously 
discussed. Investor confidence may be of particular concern in a 
market like New Zealand as it is relatively small and relies on 
overseas investors whom do not have the same level of information 
concerning the New Zealand economy and government operation as 
New Zealanders do feeling confident enough to invest. 
Thus a regime whereby the permission of the judiciary to 
bring a facility within the scope of the Act would be beneficial 13 I. 
This could be done by either enacting a broad provision that a court 
order that the regime was to apply would have that effect, or by 
requiring the court to fit a facility within the definition of a 
"facility" as proscribed in the regime. 
The next step in the regime would be to require a regulatory 
body to enforce the terms of access whenever an access order had 
been granted. As has been learnt from the Australian analysis 
above, regulatory bodies are better able than courts to make such 
determinations in that they have more appropriate skills to do so. 
Further, economies of scale are likely to occur where one national 
body seeks to regulate access, rather than a multitude of 
independent industry specific bodies attempting to do so. The 
constant change in market conditions makes a regulatory authority 
the appropriate body to determine access conditions rather than a 
court whose processes are more time consuming and thus whose 
ability to respond quickly to a change in market conditions is 
limited. The regulatory body should always be designated the role 
of determining access terms and conditions as this ensures that 
consistency is maintained throughout access determinations. Such 
consistency encourages certainty within the market place which is 
of particular concern in a small market like New Zealand.132 In the 
131 Pengilley supports such a view. See above note 42,49. 
132 It should be noted that in his alternative proposal to the Committee's recommendations 
Pengilley, above note 41 advocates a system whereby it is only in the absence o
f the 
court's ability to establish prices and access conditions that the regulatory body
 is to be 
deemed with the task of determining such conditions of access. This however, it
 is 
argued, potentially allows a decision making body with little economic skills to
 define 
terms of access of which it may know very little. The better approach seems to 
be to 
universally designate the determination of access conditions to a regulatory au
thority. 
New Zealand context it may well be that such a regulatory body 
should be the Commerce Commission. This Commission has 
experience in competition law issues in general and well 
understands the issues involved in essential facility regulation. The 
cost of establishing an independent body like the NCC seems to be 
of little value in New Zealand in light of the size of the market and 
the limited pool of experts able to staff such a venture. 
Appeals concerning the approach taken by the regulatory 
body should be available in the courts. This should take the form of 
a provision for judicial review. Although the body may be 
somewhat subject to regulatory capture such capture is not likely to 
be as great as that capable of occuring in Ministerial decision-
making as previously discussed. Allowing any greater right of 
review in the courts would only prolong unnecessarily any claim 
made to essential facilities. As facilities holders are likely to be well 
endowed with resources to engage in appeals, any further right of 
appeal may only serve to further imbalance the practical ability of 
parties to obtain equal access to justice . 
The proposed regime would thus require essential facilities 
holders to grant potential market entrants access to their facility in 
circumstances where the inadequacies of the market required this. 
Intervention in the market's operation would be justified when this 
enhanced competition and therefore efficiency. This would mean 
that the regime had the same overarching goal as the Commerce 
Act. Which would ensure consistency throughout the application of 
competition law. 
2 The benefits of an access regime 
Firstly, the concerns of the recent mcrease m essential facility 
type holders existing in the market as a whole in view of recent 
governmental deregulation are addressed if a separate access 
regime is established. This is because the proposed regime would 
have a wider ambit than that currently existing under section 36. 
While a court order would still be required to determine 
whether a facility should fall within the scope of the Act such 
litigation would be relatively brief in nature. Thus parties would 
benefit from the existence of a regime in that there would no longer 
be the need for them to bring lengthy section 36 action. The length 
of such an action in an essential facilities type case is generally due 
to the need for the court to determine what the terms of any order 
to supply at a reasonable price are. 133 As under the proposed 
regime a regulatory body would be charged with such a function 
the court action would be speedier. There would be no need for the 
133 See for example the Telecom Communications of New Zealand Ltd v Clear 
Communications litigation above note 72. 
court to even attempt to determine the access conditions and make 
an assessment as to whether it was indeed capable of deciding on 
reasonable access conditions. 
Further long term investor confidence in New Zealand would 
increase as there would be certainty that once a judicial order that 
the regime was to apply to a facility had been made, this would 
stand. This would ensure greater certainty than is available in the 
Australian regime where Ministerial decisions are more subject to 
change as there are not the same constitutional barriers to 
amending a Ministerial decision as there are in altering a judicial 
decision which must be appealed. Although the proposed regime 
would be less flexible than the Australian approach in that there is 
not the flexibility for a Ministerial decision to immediately provide 
for a facility to be covered by the regime, this is outweighed in a 
market the size of New Zealand in the gains made to investor 
certainty. 
A separate regime is also beneficial to the rule of law. As the 
philosophy of the essential facilities doctrine focuses largely on the 
harm caused to independent competitors it could potentially be 
difficult to reconcile this with the policy of the Commerce Act of 
preventing harm to competition generally. A separate regime 
allows these two policies to co-exist side by side without difficult 
inconsistencies resulting. 
V I CONCLUSION 
The essential facilities doctrine is renowned for the inherent 
difficulties that exist in defining its elements and the enforcement 
of any order it requires as to access. 
This paper has considered the essential elements of the 
doctrine. We have then moved to consider the interesting and novel 
approach which has been taken to these inherent difficulties in 
Australia. The adoption of the Hilmer Committee report 
recommendations in the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 have 
much merit. 
However our analysis, particularly in light of capture theory 
concerns and the specialized skills which the enforcement of the 
doctrine requires, has lead to the conclusion that an access regime 
could be better formulated. The principal weakness in the CPRA 1s 
that Ministerial discretion is used to determine when a service 
should be declared. As has been acknowledged above this leads to 
difficulties in that there is significant potential for a Ministers 
decision to simply reflect the view of facility holders rather than 
the views of all interested parties. 
In light of this Australian analysis the paper has considered 
whether a separate access regime similar to that existing in 
4-1 
Australia is desirable or whether the essential facilities doctrine 
should be incorporated in a different manner. 
The paper has concluded that there may be some merit in the 
import of the essential facilities doctrine into New Zealand law in 
light of recent deregulation of many of New Zealand's essential type 
facilities. 
However,difficulties in the court's administration of the 
essential facilities doctrine warrants its rejection from its 
incorporation into New Zealand's common law. The fact that the 
court would have to administer the terms of access if the doctrine 
was enacted as an amendment to section 36 warrants the rejection 
of this approach. The difference in philosophy of the Commerce Act 
and the doctrine further prevents an additional section being 
incorporated into the Commerce Act. 
Thus the best solution of importing the essential facilities 
doctrine into New Zealand law lies in the establishment of a 
separate regime for such facilities, operating outside of the scope of 
the Commerce Act. Given the analysis concerning the Australian 
regime this paper adopts the stance that such a regime should 
provide for legislative definition as to what an essential facility 
should be. This definition should grant the legislature a reasonable 
amount of latitude so that they can determine this issue on a case 
by case basis. The enforcement of an access order should be left to 
the Commerce Commission given their expertise and skill. 
The enactment of such a regime would provide further 
protections to competitors and encourage the participation of new 
entrants in the market. 
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